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In March 2011, demonstrations erupted in the southern city of Deraa after a dozen schoolboys 
were arrested and tortured for painting anti-government graffiti on a wall. This event is 
considered as the spark that triggered the Syrian uprising, which turned into a protracted 
war marked daily by excruciating violence. According to the widely believed narrative, when 
family members went to enquire about the fate of the arrested boys, a security official replied: 
‘Forget your children. Go make more children. If you don’t know how, bring your wives and we will show 
you’.1 Whether true or not, this story made an impact and fuelled the existing anger against 
the regime. Meanwhile, from the very beginning of the revolution, in people’s minds, the 
threat of sexual abuse lingered.
In its attempt to crush the revolution and 
remain in power, the Assad regime has 
resorted to every possible tactic, from 
torture to enforced disappearance, and 
from indiscriminate bombings to the use 
of chemical weapons.2 Sexual violence 
against women, and especially rape, has 
been no exception. Massive harassment 
of female prisoners, sexual assaults and 
repeated rapes have become part of the 
repressive arsenal of the Syrian government 
as it started to feel under threat. Still, sexual 
violence committed by pro-regime forces 
has been little documented and has not 
raised attention.
Addressing sexual violence within the UN 
agenda on Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS), the UN Secretary General estimated 
that it ‘has been a characteristic of the Syrian 
conflict from its inception’3 and further 
noted in April 2016 that ‘sexual violence 
continues to be systematically used as a 
tactic of warfare, torture and terrorism’4 
in Syria. Meanwhile, developing the WPS 
agenda, Security Council Resolution 1820 
established the necessity to protect women 
from sexualised violence in conflict and 
Resolution 2242 highlighted that conflict 
resolution needs to include measures to 
ensure women’s protection and to fight 
sexual violence. Yet, the Security Council 
has neither discussed nor taken meaningful 
action on sexual violence committed by 
pro-government forces in Syria. Instead, 
the debate has tended to concentrate on 
violence committed by extremist and terror 
groups. For instance, the disproportionate 
attention of political leaders and media on 
Yazidi women and ISIS’s crimes convey the 
wrong impression that sexual violence was 
committed only by one party to the conflict 
– to the utter dismay of survivors of violence 
committed by the regime. 
Sexual violence against Syrian women by 
the regime has been overlooked mainly 
because very few survivors dare to speak 
out. In any culture and any conflict, reporting 
sexual violence is sensitive and entails risks. 
In the Syrian case, the fear is even more 
entrenched. In the Syrian patriarchal society, 
the honour of a family is closely linked to 
women. Sexual abuse of a woman brings 
shame to the family and to the entire 
community. Many former detainees – 
whether raped or not were rejected by their 
families. The protracted conflict, stigma, lack 
of access to survivors and fear of retaliation 
explain why this aspect of the repression has 
been largely under-reported.
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Still, the pattern of sexual crimes reveal 
that pro-regime security forces have been 
committing rapes in the midst of the 
conflict, intentionally and strategically, 
in circumstances and facilities under 
their authority and have moreover been 
targeting specific women. As rape has 
certainly not been opportunistic (besides 
a few exceptions), understanding how the 
government has been instrumentalising 
sexual violence militarily and politically 
enables us to grasp the regime’s strategy 
to defeat and subjugate the opposition using 
sectarian discourse. Sexual crimes have been 
part of the regime’s policy of repression and 
display some common patterns and a degree 
of organisation, which raises the issue of the 
responsibility of high-level officials. 
This research is based on more than 70 
interviews with 20 survivors of rape, dozens of 
former detainees, dozens of doctors, lawyers, 
activists and humanitarian workers, as well 
as three defectors from the regime security 
apparatus. From March to November 2016, 
interviews were conducted in person in Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, or on Skype, alongside 
Syrian translators. Three additional interviews 
with survivors were excluded because they 
seemed exaggerated or false. Names of people 
referred to by their first names only have been 
changed to protect their safety. Some other 
specific information has been withheld in 
order to protect their anonymity.
Syrian people living in refugee camps were 
not considered for this study, because 
authorisations are difficult to obtain, which 
complicated the access. Most importantly, 
the camp setting is not an environment 
that is safe and private enough to interview 
survivors without taking the risk of harming 
them. De facto, this excludes from the 
research a segment of the population, most 
likely the most economically vulnerable ones. 
Because of a lack of access to people from 
the southern governorates, this research 
doesn’t reflect experience of women from 
the south. Witnesses and survivors were 
met through a wide network of activists 
and social workers. 
While the number of actual survivor 
testimonies might seem modest, given the 
high sensitivity of the topic and the current 
context with the on-going conflict, and the 
absence of support for abused women, it 
is extraordinarily challenging to convince 
survivors to talk. The testimonies provide, 
however, consistent information. This paper 
should thus be considered as a starting point 
for further research. 
The below contains graphic descriptions of 
sexual violence.
1. RAPE, A HIDDEN CRIME 
OF THE REGIME 
As the contestation escalated and turned 
more violent, the Syrian government 
intensified its repression against civilians 
actively involved with the opposition, as well 
as against people perceived to be associated 
with it. Over the months, a pattern 
appeared as sexual violence occurred in 
5 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/
HRC/31/68, 11 February 2016, http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
CoISyria/A-HRC-31-68.pdf. 
detention centres, during military operations 
conducted by the pro-regime forces, at 
checkpoints, or after kidnappings by pro-
government militias. While the scale and 
the geographical locations are difficult to 
assess precisely, especially since the conflict 
is still on-going, rapes appear to have been 
the most frequent from late 2011 to 2013, 
in disputed areas such as the Damascus 
suburbs, and in central and coastal 
governorates. Security forces have been 
targeting women perceived as supporting 
the revolution, whether they have or not in 
fact, and whose male relatives have been 
involved in anti-government activities. Rapes 
have been committed by pro-regime security 
forces, whether intelligence agents, soldiers 
or paramilitary.
 
Detention centres
According to an estimate by United Nations 
investigators, Syrian security forces detain 
tens of thousands of people at any one 
time.5 Testimonies show that sexual crimes 
have been taking place in detention centres 
run by intelligence agencies. Detainees have 
sometimes been transferred to civilian 
prisons, prior to their release. But no rape 
has been reported there, according to 
testimonies and to the main Syrian and 
international human rights monitors. 
According to former detainees’ testimonies, 
women frequently faced harassment 
and degrading treatment with a sexual 
dimension while in custody. During searches 
or interrogations, women frequently 
reported that guards touched them all 
over the body, including on the breast and 
on the bottom. In some instances, guards 
subjected detainees to cavity searches. 
During interrogations, guards explicitly 
threatened women with rape in order to 
scare them.
Sexual crimes have been perpetrated 
at different levels and under various 
circumstances. According to survivors’ 
accounts, even though rape was not used 
as a technique of torture during questioning 
to directly coerce confessions (except in 
one case), assaults were related to the 
investigation process and took place in 
several cases in the interrogation room. Most 
of the time, women were not raped during 
the interrogation itself. Sexual assaults 
were perpetrated occasionally before, and 
more often between questioning sessions, 
in order to pressure the detainees. As a 
matter of fact, several survivors recounted 
being raped several times over a few 
weeks. The purpose of perpetrators was 
clearly to terrorize women, to conquer 
resistance and thus force them to talk. 
When women didn’t confess anything, they 
were in several instances raped at the end 
of the interrogation process, seemingly as 
retaliation. Yasmin, a student detained at the 
end of 2012 at the Branch 235 or Palestine 
Branch in Damascus. She was raped four 
times in between interrogation sessions. 
‘After two hours, I was feeling very weak. 
He took me to a normal room on the sixth 
floor. He laid me down on bed, tied my 
hands, (…) he raped me in a painful and 
harsh way, like a monster. I started crying. 
He said: ‘Are you going to speak? See how 
strong I am?’ It happened three times.’
In several instances, the head of the branch 
or an intelligence agent ordered guards to 
rape a detainee. Two women recounted 
separately being brought to the branch 
director’s office, where they were assaulted. 
Ghalia was arrested at the end of 2013, 
as she was inquiring about her husband 
who had been detained for taking part 
in demonstrations. The interrogators used 
Ghalia to pressure her husband to reveal 
names of alleged accomplices. The director 
ordered one of the guards to rape her. ‘He 
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Sexual crimes have been part of the regime’s policy 
of repression and display some common patterns and 
a degree of organisation, which raises the issue of the 
responsibility of high-level officials.
4came close to me, took off my clothes and 
raped me. I don’t know how other guards 
reacted around us. It felt like I was out of 
this world.’ Later on, in the most humiliating 
way, the director ordered the guards and 
Ghalia to imitate a pornographic movie 
that was on display on television in the 
room. Both guards raped her, one of them 
by using a wooden stick. Rape was also a 
way for the head of the branch to assert 
authority. For instance, Hind was raped 
as a punishment for breaking the rules. 
After being questioned, she was taken 
back to her cell, which she shared with five 
observant Muslim Sunni women. Altogether, 
they started praying, which is forbidden in 
intelligence prisons. The guards, who saw 
them through video surveillance, burst into 
the cell and took Hind and two other women 
to the office of the director. One by one he 
raped them. 
In addition, lower rank agents perpetrated 
rapes that often took place in a detainee’s 
cell when she was alone. Assaults could 
also happen in hallways when a guard 
was escorting a detainee from her cell to 
another room. Two survivors reported gang 
rapes. Noor, a student from a coastal city, 
was detained in several branches in late 
2012. At the Military Intelligence Branch in 
Tartus, after four days of interrogation and 
severe torture, as she was falling asleep, 
four agents entered her cell. ‘One of them 
tied me up and suspended me from the 
ceiling. The first guard raped me in this 
position. Then he left the room and the 
others raped me. One said: ‘Damn Islam! We 
want to rape all Sunnis girls!’ After the third 
one raped me, I fainted.’ In several cases, 
survivors recounted being raped by anal or 
oral penetration, which women perceived as 
an additional humiliation. Perpetrators also 
sometimes used objects such as wooden 
stick or electric sticks. Several survivors said 
that their rapists acted brutally on purpose 
and enjoyed inflicting extra pain. 
These assaults usually had severe 
consequences for the health of the women. 
Maryam, a student who was pregnant, was 
raped at the Air Force Intelligence Branch 
in Damascus. ‘I was in so much pain and 
I was afraid for the baby. I was bleeding. 
I was transferred to the military hospital 
601, in Mezze. I had a miscarriage.’ Two 
women reported becoming pregnant after 
being raped during their detention. This is 
what happened to Ghalia. After she told 
the doctor of the prison, a guard gave her 
four pills that terminated the pregnancy. 
The other woman gave birth after she was 
released. In addition to the psychological 
trauma, most survivors have suffered from 
infections, gynaecological inflammation 
and have had very limited, if any, access to 
medical treatment. 
Military operations
From late 2011, facing opposition territorial 
gains and increasing militarisation, the 
regime engaged in a violent fight for its 
survival. Across the country, the Syrian army, 
assisted by brutal and feared pro-regime 
militias called Shabbiha, conducted military 
operations and raids on pro-opposition 
neighbourhoods. Accounts of widespread 
rapes during these operations have circulated 
but it has been extremely challenging to 
corroborate them and the scope of the 
crimes. In many instances, local residents 
were killed during these offensives and the 
few who survived fled abroad. However, 
the picture that emerged from survivors 
indicates a common pattern. Aiming at 
retaking the control of a neighbourhood 
and clearing it from opposition fighters, 
pro-regime armed forces usually targeted 
all the families living in a delimitated area. 
They usually raided houses, often separating 
men from women, and reportedly raped 
women in several instances before killing 
most of residents. 
The central and mixed governorate of Homs 
was one of the focuses of the raids carried 
by the regime forces. Pro-regime militias 
committed rapes during the massacre of 
Al Houla (Homs governorate), the first 
6 Oral Update of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/20/CRP.1, 5-11, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
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pdf. 
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her security.
large-scale massacre. On 25 May 2012, the 
Shabbiha attacked Al Houla, and reportedly 
killed more than 100 people, a majority of 
which were women and children in their 
homes.6 Al Houla is predominantly Sunni 
and is surrounded by Shia and Alawite 
villages. On that day, after a demonstration, 
clashes between pro-regime forces and 
anti-government armed groups erupted. 
Shortly after, the Shabbiha started raiding 
homes. Fawziya, a 41-year old resident from 
Taldou, part of Al Houla, was at her home 
with 27 relatives who escaped the fighting 
nearby. Four militiamen entered, shouting 
‘Oh Ali, Oh Hussein’.7 ‘We came to take 
revenge from Alaa’, one of them added, 
alluding to a militia member who was killed 
in the clashes earlier. As all members of the 
family were gathered in the same room, 
they obliged Fawziya and her 21-year old 
daughter, Reham, to take their clothes off. 
One of the Shabbiha first raped Reham, 
forcing her father to watch. ‘We want to 
take your honour’ said one of the armed 
men. As Fawziya pled with the militiamen 
to spare her family, another man raped her 
anally. The assault was so brutal that Fawziya 
had three broken ribs. ‘You’re Sunni, you’re 
Muslim, we want to eat your flesh’ Fawziya 
last heard before fainting. The men thought 
she was dead, which is why she eventually 
survived. When Fawziya woke up, she 
realised that the Shabbiha had killed most 
of her relatives. Only four girls and one of 
her cousins survived because they were 
assumed dead. Since she was unconscious, 
she doesn’t know if other female relatives 
were raped before being murdered.
In the same way, brutal operations took 
place in the opposition strongholds in the 
city of Homs, dubbed ‘the capital of the 
revolution’, such as Jobar, Khalidyeh, or 
Karm al-Zeitoun. Early 2012, Syrian Army 
soldiers reportedly raided houses in Jobar. 
One of the survivors told her sister in law, 
Um Ammar, that the soldiers took the 
men outside of the houses and kept the 
women and children inside. Um Ammar’s 
sister in law was raped by a soldier along 
with seven women in their twenties. The 
survivor reported that the seven women 
were killed, along with ten children.8
Smaller scale security operations also put 
women at risks. A Lebanese therapist, Aya 
Mhanna, collected testimonies of survivors 
from Homs while working with them 
through an NGO in Beirut, Lebanon. She 
met two sisters: Salwa, 20 years old, and 
Saheha, 18 years old. In early 2013, five men 
wearing civilian clothes stormed their house 
in Homs city because they were looking for 
two of their brothers who were members 
of the armed opposition. First, the men 
beat the women. Then, two men grabbed 
each sister and held them, as two others 
raped each of the women. Similarly, an aid 
worker from Damascus assisted a doctor 
when she examined two teenagers of 13 
and 14 years old who were pregnant. The 
girls said they had been raped during an 
operation by the Syrian army in Khalidyeh 
neighbourhood in Homs city. As the soldiers 
were searching houses and looking for 
weapons, they took many women living on 
the street inside the houses and reportedly 
raped them. Other journalists and doctors 
recounted consistent stories from military 
operation in Homs city, in 2012-2013, when 
women and teenage girls (in one case a 
10 or 11-year-old girl), were raped in their 
houses while their family members were 
killed. Similar operations were conducted in 
2012 in Damascan suburbs such as Darayaa 
and Douma. The repetition of sexual crimes 
under the same operational mode in various 
areas during military operations targeting 
the opposition indicates that rapes were 
part of these attacks.
69 This is corroborated by several UN reports 
such as: UN Human Rights Council, Report of 
the Independent International Commission 
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Checkpoints
Pro-regime forces have been setting up 
many checkpoints in any location deemed 
sensitive. These checkpoints are manned 
by the Syrian military or by Shabbiha. They 
have been searching women, looking for 
any evidence of support for the opposition 
such as medicine, large amounts of money, 
media equipment, amongst other things. 
One activist said that women were afraid to 
cross checkpoints in the dark without a male 
relative, fearing harassment. Two women 
recounted being raped at checkpoints in the 
outskirts of Damascus. On an evening in late 
2012, Amal, a 26-year old aid worker from 
Eastern Ghoutta, an opposition stronghold 
in the outskirts of Damascus, was going 
home from her office in the capital. She 
was carrying painkillers and disinfectant for 
a neighbour, but the soldiers who searched 
her believed it was for opposition members. 
A soldier then drove Amal to an unknown 
building, where he questioned her about the 
medicine. He insulted her and beat her. Then 
he removed her hijab and her long black 
manteau, a traditional coat. He tore the 
rest of Amal’s clothes apart. “Ask the Free 
Syrian Army to protect you! They want to 
kill us, they want to rape our women”, the 
soldier said. Then he penetrated her, orally 
and anally. Many aid workers and journalists 
recounted cases of sexual abuses or rape at 
checkpoints across the country, targeting 
women because of assumed support for 
the opposition or because of the area they 
lived in.
Kidnappings 
At the beginning of the conflict, Shabbiha 
and other pro-regime militias frequently 
kidnapped women, as the expression of 
animosity between communities or as part 
of a grim tit for tat with the opposition 
after earlier abduction. Especially frequent 
in Homs governorate, they most often 
targeted women from Sunni pro-opposition 
neighbourhoods.
In Damascus in mid-2012, Doctor Ahmad 
was called by a colleague working for a 
relief organisation. He needed help to treat 
nineteen girls and women from Homs who 
had just been released as part of an exchange 
deal between Shabbiha and an opposition 
armed group. They had been abducted by 
Shabbiha in retaliation of the kidnapping of 
an Alawite officer. Dr Ahmad, his colleague 
and a female gynaecologist took them to a 
discrete and empty house. The women, aged 
from 14 to 28 years old, were terrified. The 
gynaecologist established that some women 
had been raped several times and that three 
were pregnant – including the 14-year old 
girl. They eventually had abortions in secret. 
Soon after, one of the women committed 
suicide. While this case of mass kidnapping 
seems rather unusual, journalists and aid 
workers from Homs reported many cases of 
women who had been abducted and raped.9 
Zeinab, a journalist from Homs, noted that 
kidnappings were very frequent from mid-
2011 until late 2012, when the opposition 
was more attentive to security in areas it 
controlled. Zeinab interviewed a dozen of 
girls, who were abducted on the street or in 
taxis and taken to a neighbourhood under 
regime control. They were kept there until 
their family paid a ransom. Two-thirds of the 
girls told Zeinab that they had been raped 
during this time.
Scale and occurrence 
Assessing the precise prevalence of rapes is 
tremendously challenging because of the 
women’s reluctance to speak and because 
of the lack of access. Based on information 
collected, it is impossible to conclude that 
sexual violence by regime forces is a mass 
phenomenon. However, survivors and 
witness testimonies indicate that rapes 
occurred repeatedly. Most survivors, and 
many former detainees, witnessed rapes 
of other women. Some saw it in front of 
their own eyes or saw women who had 
just been raped, while other talked with 
cellmates who said they had suffered a 
similar experience. Um Ammar was detained 
in Homs Military Intelligence Branch in 
December 2012. When she came back to 
her cell after being raped, her co-detainees 
tried to comfort her. One said ‘Be strong, 
what happened to you happened to us 
before.’ Each of the eleven women detained 
in Um Ammar’s cell said several men raped 
them. Altogether, survivors reported several 
dozens of cases of rape in their immediate 
surroundings. In addition, doctors, human 
rights activists, journalists and aid workers 
reported over a hundred and thirty cases of 
rape that survivors directly told them about. 
Most of the reported sexual crimes took 
place between the end of 2011 and the 
end of 2014, with a peak in 2012, and 
comparatively fewer cases in 2014. In an 
exceptional case, a woman said she was 
raped a few weeks after the start of the 
revolution, on 5 April 2011 while being 
detained for taking part in a demonstration. 
This suggests that rapes have been following 
the trend of the conflict. From late 2011 to 
2013 the frontlines were extremely fluid. 
In 2012, the opposition gained significant 
ground in the north, the northwest and in 
the south, before fighting intensified as the 
regime struggled for its survival. In 2013, 
the regime counter-offensive, supported 
by foreign fighters, started bearing fruits. 
Each camp’s territory overall became 
more defined and the pro-government 
forces largely stopped conducting raids in 
opposition neighbourhoods. They were thus 
rarely in contact with civilians supporting 
the opposition. Crimes such as the ones 
committed in Homs governorate in 2012 
were less likely to take place. Since 2014, the 
regime has overall regained the upper hand. 
The perpetration of sexual violence therefore 
seems concomitant with the most disputed 
and uncertain phases of the conflict. Rapes 
seem to have been more frequent when 
the regime felt the most under threat and 
used every means to retain power. While 
the frequency of sexual violence may have 
decreased in 2015 and 2016, borders have 
been closed down and it has been difficult 
for survivors to escape Syria and to share 
their stories.
Sexual crimes have been committed more 
frequently when the regime was at its most 
fragile, as well in the areas that it was the 
most afraid to lose. These places have been 
the most contested first politically and then 
militarily, and territory has usually been split 
between communities. Detainees were 
frequently transferred from detention centres 
in a governorate to the capital. Cases have 
been most frequently reported at Branch 235 
or the Palestine Branch in Damascus, Branch 
215 or the Military Intelligence Branch in 
Damascus, and the Military Intelligence Branch 
in Homs. More broadly, rapes have been 
committed in prisons in Damascus, Homs, 
Hama, Latakya, Tartous. These match areas 
where the regime felt undermined because 
of the support gathered by the opposition. 
Later on, fighting raged in Damascus and the 
central governorates. Prisoners in Damascus 
came from cities or neighbourhoods that 
have been supporting largely the opposition 
and have been predominantly Sunni, such as 
Eastern Ghoutta or Daraya. Similarly, many 
checkpoints have been set up on the edge 
of opposition strongholds surrounded by 
areas loyal to the regime that needed to be 
contained. Sexual violence taking place at 
these crossing points corresponds with anti-
government areas. For instance, survivors 
reported being raped at Khadijye checkpoint 
next to Al Qadam, Damascus, and at An 
Nour checkpoint next to Eastern Ghoutta. 
Residents of Eastern Ghoutta, in the outskirt 
of Damascus were largely considered as 
“terrorists” by the regime. Beyond political 
affiliation, these areas are predominantly 
inhabited by middle or lower class Sunni 
and, except in the Damascus area, are often 
surrounded by or close to Alawites districts. 
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This has entailed communitarian tensions and 
a feeling of being demographically under 
pressure among the pro-regime constituency. 
In the same way, military operations involving 
rapes mainly took place in Homs governorate, 
and around Damascus, which have been 
restive and a priority in the regime’s fight. 
Conversely, rapes have been reported to a 
markedly lesser degree in the eastern and 
northern governorates.
Survivors
Women of any age can be assaulted, from 
10 years old to 60 years old, according to 
witnesses. However, despite a handful of 
cases under 18 and few over 45, the majority 
of the survivors have been in their twenties 
and in their thirties, which corresponds with 
the age of many people involved with the 
opposition. The vast majority of survivors 
have clearly been observant Sunni, wearing 
hijab.10 One Christian woman reported being 
raped and she stands as an exception, along 
with another woman who was an atheist. 
Another survivor was also detained with two 
Alawite women who said they had been 
raped. Women assaulted during kidnappings 
or military operations were all Sunni as 
well. For instance, the nineteen women 
kidnapped by Shabbiha in Homs and treated 
by a doctor in Damascus were all Sunni 
women wearing hijab. The regime security 
forces undoubtedly have been targeting 
women based on their political affiliation, 
whether proven or suspected. Women have 
been arrested merely for having a picture 
of the revolution flag on their phones, for 
participating in demonstrations, or for being 
involved in opposition activities as associated 
with aid relief, medical support, journalism, 
and similar. Hind, who joined the protests 
from the beginning, demonstrated and 
distributed leaflets to encourage people to 
join the movement. In mid-2012, intelligence 
agents, the moukhabarat, arrested her 
at the university. Pro-regime forces also 
pursued women whose relatives belonged 
to political opposition or to the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA), the anti-government moderate 
armed group, even if they didn’t take part 
themselves in political activity. For example, 
Maryam, who was not an activist, was 
arrested shortly after her husband defected 
from the Syrian army. Before raping her, 
during the interrogation, a guard showed 
her a list of “terrorists”. Her name appeared 
on it and was underlined. Salwa and Saheha, 
the sisters from Homs, were raped as security 
forces were looking for their brothers, two 
FSA members. 
Likewise, women have also been targeted 
according to the area they came from, as 
explained above. These areas have been 
predominantly Sunni and pro-opposition. 
Several activists pointed out that educated 
women from well-known families or with 
connections within the government, 
journalists and high profile activists have 
been treated carefully in prison. Intelligence 
agents have probably been avoiding 
assaulting women able to denounce sexual 
violence publicly. According to several 
testimonies, the regime security forces 
seem to have been trying to spare women 
from the centre of Damascus and to treat 
them comparatively better. In its strategy to 
consolidate the support of the Damascus 
bourgeoisie and in order to avoid an uprising 
in the heart of the capital, the pro-regime 
forces have been selecting the population 
they attacked. Similarly, people from Aleppo 
were relatively spared in order not to alienate 
wealthy Sunni industrialists.
Perpetrators
According to testimony, the overwhelming 
majority of men committing rapes have 
been State forces11, namely intelligence 
agents and soldiers, as well as Shabbiha, 
even though they sometimes wear civilian 
clothes or a uniform that women can’t 
recognise. Their ranks vary and survivors 
have often not been able to identify them. 
In several cases, mid-level members of the 
security forces or the head of the prison 
committed rapes. The remaining acts were 
perpetrated by lower level security agents. 
In two separate accounts, Lubna and 
Noor described how an agent ordered his 
12 UN Security Council Resolution 1820 
(2008), S/RES/1820. 
Zainab Bangura, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence 
in Conflict, with a child in Syria   
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subordinates to rape them as he did. In other 
cases, several perpetrators were involved, 
even though not at the same time. Several 
survivors noted that their rapist was Alawite, 
either because of his name, dialect or accent. 
Lubna noticed that the officer who raped her 
was wearing a bracelet with Shiia names, a 
medallion with the sword of the Prophet Ali 
(the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad 
who is revered by Alawites), and a badge 
from Sayeda Zaynab shrine (a holy Shia 
shrine close to Damascus). This does not 
imply that all perpetrators were Alawites. 
For example, one survivor, Lama, reported 
that the guard who raped her at the Political 
Security Branch in Latakya in May 2013 and 
who was from her village, was Sunni. 
Some videos allegedly indicate the 
involvement of Syrian army soldiers in 
rapes. A doctor and an activist said they 
saw pictures of naked women and videos 
of rapes when they checked the phone of 
captured Syrian army soldiers. In September 
2012 in a northern neighbourhood of 
Damascus, Dr Ahmad treated a Syrian army 
soldier who had been captured by a FSA 
member. Dr Ahmad saw seven videos of 
the soldier raping different women, in a 
building close to a checkpoint operated by 
the Syrian army. The member of the FSA 
recognised the women. One was his sister 
and the six other were his neighbours. He 
noticed that their hijab had been removed, 
which constituted an additional offense 
for the women. ‘They were fully naked, 
their hands tied up in their back. I could 
hear a voice in the background, which 
was probably the man filming the video, 
encouraging the soldier during the rape’ said 
Dr Ahmad. This shows that far from being 
isolated events, several men were involved 
in these assaults, and they didn’t happen 
by accident since men decided to keep a 
memento of it. Yet, it must be noted that 
guards didn’t unanimously approve of rapes 
and a few tried to help the detainees. One 
of the detainees recounted seeing a guard 
crying during interrogation after he heard 
several women saying they had been raped. 
He said: ‘How can they do that?’
In addition to the cases in which mid-level or 
high-level agents have been directly involved, 
the overwhelming majority of rapes have 
been committed in the full knowledge of 
other members of the security forces since 
men have often been participating in or 
have witnessed rapes. Or in one case, a 
guard took women to the director’s office, 
knowing the women would be exposed to 
at least some punishment. Therefore, most 
of the time, the director of the branch knew 
or should have known about the crimes that 
were committed in his prison. 
2. RAPE AS A TACTIC  
OF WAR
In Syria, pro-regime forces have been 
resorting to rape as a tactic and as a weapon 
to directly attack and weaken the opposition. 
The UN Security Council considers sexual 
violence as a tactic of war when it is used to 
‘humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse 
and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of 
a community or ethnic group.’12 Rape has 
10
also been serving the political strategy of 
the Syrian regime, in contributing to the 
repression of people and to shaping the 
conflict. In addition, by applying a sectarian 
discourse to sexual violence, the regime has 
been indicating its ultimate will to force to 
submission the groups that rose against it. 
Meanwhile, the international community has 
failed to protect Syrian women from sexual 
violence and has not taken any meaningful 
action against such crimes.
The political use of sexual 
violence 
As the testimony of survivors suggests, 
rape has served as a weapon to attack 
Syrian people perceived as pro-opposition 
by humiliating women and damaging 
communities, and by punishing and taking 
revenge on people involved with the 
opposition. Rapes have also constituted 
a tactic to achieve military and political 
goals. Pro-regime security forces have 
been resorting to sexual crime to repress 
opponents and to escalate tensions. In 
addition, the sectarian discourse surrounding 
sexual violence reveals the ultimate goal of 
the regime to assert its domination and to 
subjugate the opposition. 
Because of the shame and the social stigma 
associated with sexual violence in the Syrian 
culture, rape has caused grave humiliation 
to survivors.13 ‘There is nothing worse in our 
culture’ a defector from the regime said. By 
extension, the humiliation of women spills 
over to her family, and her community. ‘In 
Syria, honour is associated with women. 
So, in order to humiliate a community, 
the regime targeted women’ explained an 
activist. Whether in detention centres or 
at home, as it happened to Fawziya in Al 
Houla, some women were raped in front 
of family members. In addition, parents or 
husbands of survivors often rejected women 
once they were released from jail. When 
Maryam was released, her husband who 
lived in a different city called her and asked 
her if she had been assaulted. She admitted 
she had been. Her husband disappeared 
and she never saw him again. ‘For me, it 
feels like the whole society rejected me,’ 
Maryam said. In the most extreme cases, 
survivors committed suicide. Sema Nassar, 
a Syrian SGBV expert, documented two 
cases of women who had being raped and 
who committed suicide after their families 
rejected them. 
Sexual violence in the Syrian conflict has 
also been used as a tool of retaliation. Most 
of the times, rape has clearly been aiming 
at punishing women for their suspected 
involvement in the revolution. Implicitly, 
it has conveyed the message that this was 
the price to pay. A director of the Political 
Security Branch in Homs told a defector: ‘The 
men have orders to take revenge on those 
vandals and to avenge their community. 
As long as those terrorists are against the 
State, everything is allowed to punish them.’ 
Women were raped after being arrested for 
carrying medicine, or for helping or treating 
FSA members. ‘You want freedom? This is 
your freedom!’ several intelligence agents 
told survivors. In the same way, being 
from an opposition stronghold amounted 
to a stand against the government and 
triggered retaliation. Women were raped 
not as individuals, but as a part of a group.14 
Safa was arrested for taking pictures during 
a demonstration in Latakya in May 2012. 
During her detention, guards threatened 
her: ‘You’re a woman from the coast. People 
there supported the revolution from the 
beginning. We will rape you!’ They didn’t 
follow through with this threat, but it shows 
that for these guards, association with early 
supporters of the revolution legitimised rape. 
Rapes were also directly aimed at taking 
revenge for attacks by armed opposition, 
whether true or suspected. This was explicit 
in the Al Houla massacre: ‘We came to take 
revenge for Alaa’, a Shabbiha said, referring 
to a fellow militiaman. A defector from 
the State Security Branch in Homs heard 
intelligence agents talking after protesters 
tore down a statue of Hafez al Assad in the 
city of Rastan in April 2011. ‘We will fuck 
all the women from Rastan’ one agent said. 
As another one was protesting, the first one 
13 Khuloud Alsaba and Anuj Kapilashrami, 
“Understanding Women’s Experience of 
Violence and the Political Economy of 
Gender in Conflict: The Case of Syria”, 
Reproductive Health Matters, 24 (2016), 
5–17. 
14 This appears to illustrate collective targeting 
as discussed in Elisabeth Jean Wood, 
“Sexual Violence During War: Variation 
and Accountability”, in Collective Violence 
and International Criminal Justice: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Alette 
Smeulers (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010).
replied: ‘Do you think we will let the regime 
fall down? We will fuck all the women to 
punish them!’
Rape has also been a powerful instrument 
to terrorize people. Marcell Shehwaro, an 
activist from Aleppo, was threatened: “If you 
continue your activities with terrorists, we’re 
going to fuck you.” Rumours quickly spread 
early in the revolution that women ran the 
risk of being sexually abused. By scaring 
women and their families, the regime aimed 
at deterring female activists from playing a 
growing role in the opposition. According to 
activists, sexual violence also played a role in 
the radicalisation and the militarisation of the 
conflict. This served the regime by shifting 
the narrative from peaceful demonstrations, 
and it justified harsh repression. Finally, most 
of the survivors of rape eventually left the 
country. After their release, women were too 
afraid to be arrested again and too ashamed 
to stay. In this way, the government has 
progressively emptied the country from 
moderate opponents. As the insurgency 
turned more radical, this confirmed the 
regime’s self-fulfilling prophecy that it was 
fighting extremists.
In parallel, the Syrian government has 
sought to increase antagonism between 
communities, not only to mobilise and 
solidify the support from minorities, but 
also to frame the conflict as a fight between 
Alawites and Sunnis instead of a struggle for 
democracy. It is important to note that the 
dynamic of the revolution was not primarily 
sectarian. Indeed, the Syrian revolution was 
not a Sunni uprising, even if its supporters 
have been predominantly Sunni.15 Still, 
sexual violence has targeted the affiliation 
to the Sunni group. 
The sectarian dimension appeared when 
pro-government security forces targeted and 
identified the other camp as the “enemy”. 
In detention centres, guards almost always 
forcibly removed women’s headscarves. In 
the State Security Branch 40 in Damascus, 
a detainee heard: “Go beat these women 
wearing headscarves”. Security forces also 
frequently insulted women in relation to God 
or to being Sunni. One detainee was forced 
to say “I’m a Sunni bitch”, by a guard at the 
Air Force Intelligence Branch in Damascus in 
October 2013. Most significantly, in several 
instances, guards told women they raped 
them because they were Sunni. Noor, who 
was raped repeatedly, was told in both the 
Palestine Branch in Damascus and in the 
Military Branch in Tartous: “We want to rape 
all Sunnis girls”. In the Military Intelligence 
Branch in Homs, the investigator told Um 
Ammar after raping her: “We did this to 
you because you’re Sunni.” In the same 
way, Hind and one of her cellmates were 
explicitly assaulted for performing prayer 
in their cell. The director of the General 
Intelligence Branch in Damascus told Hind: 
“You know prayer is not allowed in prison. 
You know I can change you from a virgin to 
lady”. And then he raped her. This targeting 
has applied outside as well. Kidnappings 
were aimed mostly at Sunni women. And 
during raids, security forces targeted Sunni 
neighbourhoods. For instance, Al Houla in 
Homs governorate, where the first large-scale 
massacre happened, is predominantly Sunni, 
as are Eastern Ghoutta, Jobar, Baba Amr 
or Khalidyeh. As Jacques Semelin argues, 
stigmatising “the other” as radically different 
fuels the violence of repression.16 Here, 
identifying Sunni people as the enemy and 
as a threat mobilises pro-regime forces and 
becomes a self-justification for more violence 
against them. In addition, the vast majority 
of supporters of the regime, who stem from 
Alawite community or other minority groups, 
have felt numerically endangered in mix 
areas. As the regime engaged in a fight for 
+ 
The men have orders to take revenge on those vandals 
and to avenge their community. As long as those 
terrorists are against the State, everything is allowed 
to punish them.
Source: A director of the Political Security Branch in Homs told a defector
15 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s uprising and the 
Fracturing of the Levant (Abingdon: 
Routledge for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2013).
16 Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The 
Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2007).
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its survival, the conflict became increasingly 
shaped according to an “us” against “them” 
view. It appears clearly that raping Sunni 
women has amounted to assaulting the 
whole community. Sexual violence has thus 
been a way to assert sectarian domination 
over women and the opposition as well 
as to impose political power on them. In 
this regard, the sentence guards have kept 
repeating while abusing women “You want 
freedom, this is your freedom” has been fully 
realised. Opponents have not managed to 
obtain freedom and the regime has been 
firmly committed in subduing them. 
Rape, a widespread and 
systematic attack? 
Consistent accounts have shown that sexual 
crimes have belonged to a general policy 
of repression, and they have displayed 
common patterns as well as some degree 
of organisation. Even though there is no 
evidence that officials in Damascus have 
ordered rapes directly, it is unlikely they have 
not been aware of the crimes that have been 
committed. Meanwhile, the repressive policy 
has created a context conducive to rapes, 
which has fit into local dynamics.
First of all, sexual violence has always 
occurred in a repressive context, whether 
during detention or military operations aimed 
at fighting the rebellion. The evidence shows 
that rapes have been committed repeatedly 
in a large number of different detention 
facilities, at least between 2011 and 2014, as 
the regime arrested and detained arbitrarily 
thousands of people across the country. 
Guards explicitly threatened detainees 
with rape and assaulted them to pressure 
them or punish them, which demonstrates 
the link between sexual violence and the 
repressive goal of security forces. Similarly, 
when soldiers or militiamen raped women 
during military operations, this was part of 
the attack against their adversaries and their 
relatives. Thus, rape can be considered as 
part of a general policy from the authorities.
Second, a regular pattern stands out from 
survivors’ accounts regarding sexual crimes 
in prison. Women were raped alone, most 
of the time in relation to the interrogation 
process, by agents or guards watching 
them, in order to force them to confess or 
to retaliate against them. In addition, the 
repeated occurrences of rapes in houses 
during military operation, in 2012, and in 
different places in Homs province and in 
Damascus suburbs, also suggest a regular 
pattern, as detailed previously.
Third, women’s testimonies revealed some 
degree of organisation and planning in 
detention facilities. In several instances, a 
doctor treated survivors when rape had 
severe consequences on their health. 
Maryam was even transferred to the military 
hospital 601, in Mezze, Damascus, for a 
proper surgery. There, a doctor removed 
her dead foetus. All the other survivors were 
treated in a room in the prison, with a bed 
and some medical equipment. Women said 
that doctors seemed used to treating similar 
cases and didn’t look surprised. Ghalia was 
treated for severe haemorrhage after being 
gang raped. The doctor told her: “Please, 
if you have something to say, say it. Many 
women died because of rapes. You might 
also become pregnant. So please, say what 
you have to say.” A few weeks later, after 
telling a guard that she might be pregnant, 
Ghalia saw a doctor again for a blood test. 
He didn’t tell her she was pregnant but 
he prescribed what she discovered were 
abortive pills. It shows doctors not only 
knew that some detainees were brutally 
raped, but also that one of their missions 
was to treat the result of savage assaults. 
This leads to the conclusion that security 
forces organised medical care to deal with 
the consequences of what they inflicted 
+ 
Rapes seem to have been more frequent when the 
regime felt the most under threat and used every 
means to retain power.
17 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu; 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v 
Furundžija. 
18 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/
HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013.
on detainees. In addition, survivors and 
witnesses reported that guards distributed 
contraceptive or emergency pills in fall 2013 
in the Palestine Branch in Damascus and in 
June 2014 in the State Security Branch in 
Deir Ezzor. At the Palestine Branch, cellmates 
told Suhair that guards gave them pills 
and told them “If you don’t want children, 
take this”. In the same way, Malina, who 
stayed for a few days at the State Security 
Branch in Deir Ezzor, recounted that guards 
distributed a pill to her and her cellmates 
every day. The availability and distribution 
of contraceptive pills in a detention centre 
requires a minimum of anticipation and 
planning. In addition, Yasmin recounted that 
when she was raped at the Palestine Branch 
in November 2012, the agent used Vaseline. 
These elements indicate that rapes followed 
a regular pattern that involved some degree 
of organisation and were part of a broader 
state policy of widespread repression against 
the civil population.
Rape and other forms of sexual violence 
committed during an armed conflict violate 
the laws of war. Rape by state agents is 
considered torture, as established by 
international criminal courts.17 Under the 
Rome Statute, rape constitutes a war crime 
and can constitute a crime against humanity 
if it is part of a widespread or systematic 
attack on civilians. Therefore, sexual violence 
in Syria could be prosecuted as war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.18
The fact that sexual crimes have not been 
opportunistic and fit a policy raises the 
crucial issue of the degree of responsibility 
of high-ranking officials: whether they gave 
orders, at which level and how explicitly. 
At the prison level, as described previously, 
in several instances, directors or agents 
led or ordered their subordinates to rape 
women. Between interrogation sessions, 
the interrogator forced Ghalia to watch a 
pornographic movie in his office with two 
guards. Then he said: “I want this movie to 
come true. If you play it well, I’ll give you 
each one month of holiday.” Ghalia said the 
guards were reluctant at first.”‘If you don’t 
want to do it, go away and I’ll ask two other 
agents to do it,” the commander added. 
As demonstrated earlier, in most cases, 
agents knew about rapes and often several 
perpetrators were present during the assault, 
whether in prison or in homes. According to 
a defector from the regime, in early 2012, a 
judge encouraged several detainees to file 
a complaint for rape in the Military Police 
Branch of Homs. This complaint was never 
processed and the judge received threats. 
Similarly, when Maryam dared to report 
having being raped, her claim was dismissed. 
“The interrogator said that a member from 
the Air Force Intelligence would never touch 
a terrorist.” Later on, after being tortured 
during an interrogation session, Maryam 
was taken to the office of the director of the 
Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant 
General Jamil Hassan. She had bruises on 
her face and blood was coming from the 
lower part of her body. “Don’t tell me that 
you were raped, or somebody touched 
you, or that you were tortured. I want to 
hear something that can be useful for my 
report,” he said. It was obvious that Maryam 
had been tortured and she thinks that the 
director knew about the rape. “I don’t want 
that this woman to die here. Take her to the 
hospital” he ordered finally. Lt. Gen. Hassan 
probably expected to hear allegations of 
rape. Yet, he didn’t investigate a possible 
crime committed under its authority even 
though he should have. Thus, he could be 
held accountable for Maryam’s rape under 
the doctrine of command responsibility, 
according to which a commander is liable 
for crimes committed by individuals under 
his control. Lt. Gen. Hassan, as the head of 
Air Force Intelligence Directorate, is one of 
the most powerful men in Syria. It is thus 
difficult to believe that he would have turned 
a blind eye to acts that the President would 
have not tolerated. 
No information indicates that high-level 
officials in Damascus ordered rapes. Still, 
several defectors who served in different 
departments in Homs governorate said that 
from mid-2011, the directors of intelligence 
branches in Homs received instructions from 
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Damascus. They were told to do “whatever 
you want”. This sentence was repeated like 
a leitmotiv. It implicitly allowed the security 
forces to commit any crimes. A member of 
the intelligence in Homs told a defector: “We 
received orders to do whatever we want, it 
means girls are endangered now.” Mahmoud 
worked in state institutions in Homs in 2011-
2012. A member of the intelligence told him 
that the head of the Homs Military Security 
Branch said: “Go fuck their female relative, 
do whatever you want, no one will be held 
accountable.” Similarly, Fadel Tlass, who 
served as an investigator in the State Security 
Branch in Homs city until March 2012, heard 
a high-ranking official of the branch saying: 
“Bashar al Assad thanks you for your efforts, 
(…) he wants you to do whatever you can 
to make the regime powerful and stand 
against the revolution.” It appears credible 
that this consistent information regarding 
Homs applies to other governorates, since 
similar crimes were committed in other 
areas and they took place in the context 
of a nationwide repressive policy. Besides, 
the chain of command regarding Shabbiha 
appears unclear as little is known about the 
functioning of their leadership structure. They 
don’t fall under any official body’s control 
and they enjoy a large degree of autonomy.
While the President or high level security 
officials probably didn’t give explicit orders, 
the green light to rein in the uprising by 
all means necessary provided intelligence 
regional directors and army commanders 
with flexibility in repressing the population. 
Thus, it appears that sexual violence fits 
into local dynamics. The decision to resort 
to sexual violence (or tolerate it) seems 
to have fallen under the regional level or 
even the branch and military unit level, 
especially as local directors have had a lot 
of leeway. As Semelin shows, local actors 
may take initiatives to implement violence, 
especially when there is impunity.19 The 
disparity among regions and the fact that 
rape seemingly happened less often in the 
east and in the north of the country for 
instance confirms this framework. 
Finally, the Syrian security apparatus is 
characterised by a strong hierarchy and 
an effective chain of command from the 
national to the local level. The commanding 
control is definitely in the hands of the 
President. And the fact that sexual violence 
was committed in so many branches, various 
checkpoints and during military operations 
nationwide, indicates that acts were not 
isolated or uncontrolled, but rather tolerated 
by line management. Thus, it seems unlikely 
that officials in Damascus were unaware of 
these crimes. Generally, the determination 
of the regime and the permissive context of 
impunity constituted favourable conditions 
to commit sexual crimes. In addition, the 
UN Commission of Inquiry mentioned 
sexual violence in most of its reports, but 
the government never announced an 
investigation into the allegations. Therefore 
it is plausible to assume that the regime 
tacitly tolerated sexual crimes. Last, not 
ordering rapes doesn’t exonerate officials 
at the highest levels. Under the doctrine of 
command responsibility, commanders may 
be prosecuted where they know or should 
have known of the abuses and failed to take 
action to stop them.20
The failure to implement 
the Women Peace and 
Security agenda 
Among the daily atrocities committed 
in Syria, sexual violence has largely been 
ignored. It has only been mentioned in the 
reports of the Commission of Inquiry and 
in the annual Secretary General reports on 
conflict-related sexual violence. References 
to sexual violence, or even to the WPS 
agenda have constantly been left out or 
removed from drafts during negotiations of 
Security Council resolutions.21 Over almost 
six years, the Council has only condemned 
sexual violence once in a declaration, with 
a strong focus on crimes perpetrated by 
ISIS.22 Even though civil society has tried to 
raise the issue, the UN and the countries 
supporting Syrian parties to the conflict have 
failed to take any meaningful action. An 
opportunity to implement the WPS agenda 
19 Semelin, Purify and Destroy.
20 Last March, the International Criminal Court 
convicted the former vice-president of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, for rapes its troops committed 
because it was established Bemba had 
effective authority and control over the 
forces. See International Criminal Court, The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.
21 Security Council Report, Women, Peace 
and Security : Sexual Violence in Conflict 
and Sanctions, April 2013,  http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/cross-cutting-
report/women-peace-and-security-sexual-
violence-in-conflict-and-sanctions.php. 
22 Security Council Press Statement on sexual 
violence in conflict in Middle East, 28 August 
2015, SC/12030, http://www.un.org/press/
en/2015/sc12030.doc.htm. 
and to protect women, which is one of its 
priorities, has clearly been missed. Resolution 
1960 encourages the monitoring of sexual 
violence and the “focused engagement” 
with parties suspected of such violence, 
including targeted sanctions. Yet, none of 
these options have been explored and the 
Syrian regime has escaped sanctions. The 
United Nations only supported the Syrian 
Ministry of Social Affairs to establish a women 
and child protection unit to respond to sexual 
and gender-based violence.23 Similarly, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
Zainab Bangura, did not denounce abuses 
nor took any concrete action, even though 
she visited detention centres of the Syrian 
regime in April 2015. Instead, she has focused 
on and repeatedly denounced sexual crimes 
committed by ISIS, standing in line with 
most countries’ interests. Indeed, countries 
supporting the Syrian regime don’t want it 
to be blamed, and countries belonging to 
the US-led coalition against ISIS consider that 
the priority is crimes committed by terrorists. 
More broadly, the inaction of the UN 
reflects its general passivity and helplessness 
regarding the crimes of the regime. While the 
Syrian government barred access to prisons, 
the reaction to egregious abuses such as 
torture and death in detention centres24 has 
been limited, as the UN was careful not to 
jeopardise its agencies’ access to Syria. The 
UN has also been encouraged by country 
members to focus on ISIS crimes. One can 
only wonder about the potential deterrence 
effect that a monitoring team on the ground 
may have had.
In addition, the failure to take action also 
reflects the extent to which the realisation 
of the WPS agenda lies on states.25 At 
the national level, they are in charge of 
implementing gender-sensitive measures 
and reforms. And during conflicts, states are 
responsible for protecting their populations. 
This is why when a state refuses to take 
any measures, or becomes the major 
perpetrator of violence, there are few 
alternatives allowing pursuing the WPS 
agenda. Meanwhile, at the UN level, states 
retain significant power and cannot be easily 
circumvented. The constant deadlock at 
the Security Council because of conflicting 
interests since the beginning of the war 
in Syria also illustrates how difficult it is to 
take action. If a permanent member decides 
to protect a state, the Security Council is 
paralysed, which underlines the necessity 
to reform the veto power. It demonstrates 
that the implementation of the WPS agenda 
during conflicts has been too state-centric. 
More actors should be involved at various 
levels, leading to shared responsibility. 
This could be conducive to advancing the 
prevention of and the protection from sexual 
violence. Meanwhile, a shift of mentality 
is needed, so that states commit truly to 
stand by the WPS agenda and don’t use 
it as a bargaining chip, or don’t consider it 
as a bonus ultimately easily expendable in 
negotiations. Finally, the Syrian case also 
highlights that the WPS agenda needs to 
be further developed and that concrete 
measures need to be elaborated, taking 
into account the specific context, such as 
total obstruction by a government which 
is responsible for violence against women. 
23 Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence, 23 March 2015, 
S/2015/203.
24 A report into the credibility of certain 
evidence with regard to Torture and 
Execution of Persons Incarcerated by the 
current Syrian regime, prepared for Carter-
Ruck and Co. Solicitors of London.
25 Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, “The 
Futures Past of the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda”, International Affairs 92(2) 
(2016), 373-392.
This is paper 3/2017 in the LSE Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series. 
The LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series is an outlet for research findings, position papers and policy briefs. 
The editorial board is led by Dr Paul Kirby and Associate Professor Laura J. Shepherd. www.lse.ac.uk/wps/wps
Design by LSE designunit (lse.ac.uk/designunit)
Centre for Women, Peace and Security, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
lse.ac.uk/wps  +  blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps  +  @LSE_WPS
CONCLUSION
The scope and the pattern of rapes bring an 
additional perspective to the dynamic of the 
Syrian conflict. Sexual violence against women 
has been used as a tactic in the war and has 
been an integral part to the regime policy 
of subjugation of the opposition. Therefore, 
sexual crimes must be taken into account in 
future political negotiations. They need to 
be acknowledged, alongside the suffering 
of survivors. While stigma requires sensitive 
rehabilitation programmes, acknowledgment 
of trauma and the central position of women 
can be translated into the political field, by 
giving women key positions in the leadership 
and by integrating their perspective to rebuild 
Syria. After the failure to prevent and protect 
Syrian women from sexual violence, the best 
opportunity to implement the WPS agenda 
is to focus on accountability and to involve 
women in a future peace process. UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1889 and 2122 stress the 
need to strengthen women’s participation 
during all stages of peace building. Peace 
agreements prove to be more successful if 
women sit at the negotiation table.26  This 
need for participation appears even more 
acute since Syrian women have been directly 
targeted in the conflict. And given the strategic 
nature of the sexual crimes, they will need 
to be addressed as a political issue in any 
peace settlement. Until now, Syrian women 
haven’t been well represented in previous 
peace conferences, but it is essential to include 
them in order to lead to political reform.27
In addition, perpetrators of rape and their 
commanders must be held accountable in 
order to show that sexual violence is not 
an inevitable by-product of war. Resolution 
2106 “stresses the need for the exclusion 
of sexual violence crimes from amnesty 
provisions”. Indeed, ending impunity is central 
in preventing sexual violence. Most of the 
women interviewed do feel vengeful. They, 
of course, want their rapists to be punished, 
even by death in some cases. While some 
survivors are totally disillusioned with justice, 
some believe in accountability, but only within 
an international framework. “I want this man 
to stand before a court, but an international 
one, because there is no justice in Syria,” 
said Lama, the woman who was detained 
in Latakya. Justice for survivors of sexual 
violence has proved elusive most of the time.28 
Therefore, the crimes committed in the Syrian 
conflict must be an opportunity to set an 
example regarding the fight against impunity 
for sexual crimes. Finally, dissociating a 
political settlement from justice leads to a 
deadlock. There is no lasting peace without 
accountability. As Lama concluded: “The 
victims can’t live with their killers. But if there 
is justice in the future, we will be able to live 
together again.”
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